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Litigation Involving "Termination of War"
By W. LEwis ROBERTS*
During the past two or three years there have been several
cases before the courts that present the question whether the
United States has been at war in Korea. They naturally raise the
question how and when a war is terminated.
Oppenheim, in his treatise on international law, states that a
war between two or more nations may be terminated in any one
of three ways: (1) a belligerent may end a war by subjugating
its adversary; (2) by abstaining from further acts of war and
entering into peaceful relations without making a treaty, or (3)
by formally establishing peace by making a special treaty with
its opponent.1 The solution of the problem of when a war ends,
however, is not as simple today as the classification by Oppen-
heim might lead one to believe.
At the end of World War II there were more than 500 statutes,
enacted for carrying on the war with Germany and Japan, at the
time of the Japanese surrender. These statutes contained pro-
vision for their termination upon the happening of certain events.
Many acts read that the statute shall remain in force until a cer-
tain date "or until such earlier time as Congress by concurrent
resolution or the President by proclamation may designate."2
Sometimes provision is made for an act to remain in force during
the continuance of the war and six months thereafter or so long
as the authority granted by the act is necessary in the interest of
the national defense and security.
The court decisions in cases arising at the end of World War
I do not show uniformity in settling when that war ended. Some
took the joint resolution of Congress as the end of the war, some
the proclamation of the President, and still others took the posi-
tion that the war could not legally end until the President issued
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. A.B., Brown University; A.M.,
Pennsylvania State College; J.D., University of Chicago; S.J.D., Harvard Uni-
versity.
"International Law, Vol. 2, p. 322.
'First War Powers Act, 1941, 50 U. S. C. App. ; Second War Powers
Act, 1942, 50 U. S. C. App. ; Requisition of Military Equipment, Materials
and Supplies, 1940, 50 U. S. C. App. 713; and Emergency Price Control Act,
1942, 50 U. S. C. App. 901.
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a proclamation that the warring nations had signed a treaty of
peace.
Prior to World War I there was comparatively little litigation
as to when a war ended. A case arising after the Revolution that
is sometimes cited is Ware v. Hylton.' It had to do with the col-
lection of debts due British creditors, which debts had been con-
fiscated by the Colonies. The right to collect these claims hinged
on the treaty of peace. The Supreme Court, after "mature de-
liberation," in a report covering eighty-five pages, decided that
the Virginia debtors should pay the British creditors the amount
of their claims as provided in the treaty of peace.
Several cases followed in the wake of the Civil War. Among
those sometimes cited are Stewart v. Kohn4 and The Protector.5
In the first of these decisions a New Orleans firm held a note of
New York traders. The war ensued after the note became due
March 13, 1861. Since the plaintiff could not prosecute his suit
as long as the war lasted, that time was deductible from the op-
eration of the state statute of limitationas. The second of these
decisions arose under the blockade of the southern states. The
blockade did not begin or close at the same time in all these
states. It ended in Texas by proclamation of August 28, 1866,
and in Alabama by the proclamation at the termination of the
war. Mr. Chief Justice Chase, in giving the opinion of the Court
in the Protector case, said:
In the absence of more certain criteria, of equally
general application, we must take the dates of these procla-
mations as ascertaining the commencement and the close
of the war in the States mentioned in them. Applying this
rule to the case before us, we find that the war began in
Alabama on the 19th of April, 1861, and ended on the 2nd
of April, 1866.
Consequently the five years barred the appeal in the case which
was brought May 17, 1871.
A couple of cases growing out of the Spanish War are fre-
quently cited. In re Cadwallader' deals with a case where a
soldier, who deserted on October 16, 1896, was brought to trial
3 Dall. 199 (1796).
'11 Wall. 493 (U. S., 1870).
'12 Wall. 700 (U. S., 1871).
'127 Fed. 881 (Mo. 1904).
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before a military tribunal. President McKinley had issued on
August 12, 1898, a proclamation announcing that a protocol had
been signed, agreeing to the terms of peace. The treaty was
signed December 10, 1898, and ratified on April 11, 1899. The
President's proclamation that the treaty was finally concluded
was published on April 11, 1899. The court held the desertion
took place in time of war and the soldier was subject to the juris-
diction of the military tribunal.
The second case that is much cited is Hijo v. United States.7
A claim was made by a Spanish subject to recover a vessel that
was captured in the war zone during the Spanish War. A quan-
tam meruit was sought for the use of the vessel between August
12, 1898, and the date of the protocol followed by the President's
proclamation of April 11, 1899. Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for
the Court, said:
A state of war did not in law cease until the rati-
fication in April, 1899, of the treaty of peace. 'A truce or
suspension of armies,' says Kent, 'does not terminate the
war, but it is one of the commercia belli which suspends
its operations ..
The question when the First World War ended came before
the courts in various ways. There was the question as to whether
the period of limitations for bringing actions had elapsed; wheth-
er the authorization given the President by various statutes to
take over and use private property for war purposes, such as
telegraph and cable lines and the railroads, had come to an end;
whether criminal prosecutions could still be enforced under war-
time statutes regulating the sale of liquor; the prices charged for
foods and rents; whether soldiers were still amenable to military
courts for certain offenses; and finally, the determination of rights
in private contracts that hinged on the termination of the war.
In Industrial Commission of Ohio v. Rotor8 the court con-
sidered the question whether a claim under the Workmen's Com-
pensation law was barred by two years' limitation where the
workman was an alien and suit could not be brought by his
widow during the war. It was held the statute was-suspended
until the war terminated. We quote from the court's opinion:
" 194 U. S. 315, 24 S. Ct. 727,48 L. Ed. 994 (1904).8135 Oh. St. 418. 179 N.E. 135 (1933).
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As to the exact time when the war was ended,
there is some confusion in the decisions. It is held in First
National Bank of Pittsburgh v. Anglo-Oesterreichs Bank,
87 F. (2d) 564, that as regards the statute of limitations,
the joint resolution of Congress of July 2, 1921 (42 Stat.
105) did not terminate war with Austria, since such resolu-
tion was not legally binding upon Austria, and the restora-
tion of peace can be accomplished only by bilateral treaty.
This is in spite of the fact that the proclamation of the
Peace Treaty by the President stated that peace was pro-
claimed as of July 2, 1921. However, the fact that the war
with Austria-Hungary was ended by joint resolution of
Congress upon July 2, 1921, is recognized by the Supreme
Court of the United States, and by other federal courts, in
Swiss Nat. Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Miller, Alien Property Custodian,
267 U. S. 42, 45. Ct. 213, 69 L. Ed. 504; Miller, Alien Prop-
erty Custodian v. Camp (D. C.), 280 F. 520; In re Miller,
Alien Property Custodian, (C. C. A.) 281 F. 764; Zimmer-
man v. Hicks, Alien Property Custodian, (C. C. A.) 7 F.
2d 443.
The First National Bank of Pittsburgh9 case was a suit for
balance of an 'account claimed to be due. The court in holding
that the statute was not a bar to the action said:
(1) A war can only be ended by treaty of peace
between the belligerents and while the war continues the
courts of each belligerent are closed to the nationals of the
other. . . . Second, the signing of the treaty of St. Germain
in 1919 did not terminate the war. Even if effect is given to
it by reason of its incorporation into the treaty of Vienna,
it did not become effective until the ratification of the latter
treaty of November 8, 1921. . . . The joint resolution of
Congress of July 2, 1921, did not terminate the war. This
resolution was not legally binding on Austria. ....
In the Swiss Nation Insurance Co.'0 case it was contended that
the alien corporation was entitled to a return of its property
seized by the Custodian since the war ended with the joint resolu-
tion of July 2, 1921.1 The property in question belonged to a
Swiss corporation doing business in Germany. The Trading with
the Enemy Act of October 6, 1917, provided that the right to
37 F. 2d 564.
"267 U. S. 42, 45 S. Ct. 213, 69 L. Ed. 504.
42 Stat. 105.
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property held by the Alien Property Custodian be settled as Con-
gress should direct. It was held that official termination of the
war did not ipso facto entitle owners to the sequestered property.
In Miller v. Camp" the court said the joint resolution of July 2,
1921, did not affect the right of the Alien Property Custodian to
take and hold property.
The last of the four cases cited in the Pittsburgh Bank case,
the Zimmerman case,' 3 also treated the war with Germany as
ending with joint resolution of July 2, 1921. The Versailles Treaty,
the court said, did not affect nor relate to claims of American
depositors against German or Austrian banks.
The California court in In re Bosse's Estate4 called attention
to the fact that "the Trading with the Enemy Act provided it
should remain in full force until 'the end of the war,' which it
defined in the act to mean 'the date of proclamation of exchange
of ratifications of the treaty of peace, unless the President shall
by proclamation declare a prior date."'
In Commercial Trust Co. v. Miller,'5 the court said the power
to terminate war was a legislative and not a judicial function. It
was not terminated until the cessation of hostilities by the joint
resolution of Congress following the President's proclamation of
peace.
The War-Time Prohibition Act prohibited the sale of distilled
spirits after June 18, 1919, "until the conclusion of the present
war and thereafter until the termination of demobilization, the
date of which shall be determined and proclaimed by the Presi-
dent of the United States. ... 1 The cessation of hostilities
did not end the war and the Court concluded that Congress in-
tended the Act to remain in force until demobilization was com-
plete.
Among the cases most often cited in .criminal prosecutions for
violations of war-time legislation are the following: United States
v. Hicks, 7 McKinley v. United States,'8 United States v. Switzer, 9
280 F. 520.
7 F. 2d 443.14185 Cal. 666, 200 Pac. 412 (1921).
"262 U. S. 51, 43 S. Ct. 486, 67 L. Ed. 858 (1923).
Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251 U. S. 146, 40 S. Ct. 106, 64
L. Ed. 194 (1920).
' 256 Fed. 707 (W. D. Ky. 1919).
"249 U. S. 397, 39 S. Ct. 324, 63 L. Ed. 668 (1919).
" 6 Alaska 223 (1920).
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Kohn v. Anderson,2 ° Ex parte Sichofsky,21 and Weisman v. United
States.12 In the first case the defendant was prosecuted for keep-
ing a disorderly house within a military zone. It was held the
statute under which defendant was prosecuted had not ceased
to be in force although the President's declaration to Congress
on November 11, 1918, alleged that the said war "is at an end."
In the McKinley case, another prosecution under the same stat-
ute, the conviction was sustained. The Switzer case was under
an Alaska statute imposing a penalty for uttering language dis-
respectful and contemptuous of the flag in time of war. It was
held to apply to an offense committed after November 11, 1918.
The Anderson decision upheld the power of court-martial to
punish one who murdered a fellow prisoner within the geographic
United States in time of war. The offense was committed after
the armistice. The Court said that the 92d Article of the Articles
of War contemplated a complete peace, officially proclaimed and
not brought about by the armistice. Ex parte Sichofsky arose
under the War-Time Immigration Act. It was held that the act
did not become inoperative because of the ending of actual hos-
tilities and prior to an official declaration of peace. Finally, the
Weisman case was a prosecution for stealing telegraph wires on
railroad lines then under federal control. The court refused to
hold that the war ceased on the day of the armistice.
The Act of 1918 authorized the President to take possession
of marine cables during the continuance of the war "whenever
he shall deem it necessary for the national security and defense."
It was held that the determination by the President that such
necessity existed was not subject to judicial review.23 Judge Hand
said:
It is true that a war may end by the cessation of
hostilities, or by subjugation; but that is not the normal
course, and neither had hostilities ceased, nor had the
enemy been .subjugated in the sense in which that term is
used.
In Southwestern Tel. & Tel Co. v. Houston,24 the court also took
the position that the signing of the armistice did not terminate
-255 U. S. 1, 41 S. Ct. 224, 65 L. Ed. 469 (1920).
- 273 Fed. 694 (S. D. Cal. 1921).
"271 Fed. 944 (7th C. 1921).
"Commercial Cable Co. v. Burleson, 255 Fed. 99 (S. D. N. Y. 1919).
"256 Fed. 690 (1919).
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the war. It said: "We are still at war, although actual hostilities
have been suspended and may not be renewed." It further stated
that the compensation fixed by the President for the government's
use of telephone and telegraph lines taken under the Act of 1918
was not open to question by the courts.
The Food Control Act of 1918 provided:2 5
[It] . . .shall cease to be in effect when the ex-
isting state of war between the United States and Germany
shall have been terminated and the fact and date of such
termination shall be ascertained and proclaimed by the
President.
The act was held not to cease to be in force after the armistice,
although the active fighting ceased at that time. The court ob-
served that "Congress and the President are the constitutional
judges of states of war and peace and their decisions should be
abided in patience by people and courts." 6
Tax exemption statutes passed by states during World War I
have raised the question in the courts as to when the war termi-
nated. In Dooley v. Johnson 7 the tax exemption was allowed
those serving in the Army up to the date of declaration of peace.
The court quoted from Kent: 2 "A truce or suspension of arms
does not terminate the war."
In the state of Washington a municipal charter gave prefer-
ence in employment to "honorably discharged soldiers, sailors,
and marines of the United States who have served in time of war."
It was held that it applied to one who had entered the service
after the armistice.
In the field of private contracts, three cases growing out of
the First World War period can be noted as more or less typical
of the problems involved in private contracts. They are Knee-
land-Bigelow Co. v. Michigan Central R. Co.;30 Vanderbilt v.
Travelers Ins. Co.;3 and Miller v. Illinois Bankers Life Assn.32
In the Kneeland case the plaintiff sought specific performance of
a prewar contract for hauling freight at a certain rate. The de-
- 40 Stat. 276.
=United States v. Oglesby Grocery Co., 264 Fed. 691 (N. D. Ga. 1920).
'24 P. 2d 540 (Cal. App. 1933).
'Commentaries (14th Ed.), p. 161.
"State ex rel. Peter v. Listman, 288 Pac. 913, 157 Wash. 229 (1930).
207 Mich. 546, 174 N.W. 605 (1919).
"184 N. Y. S. 54, 112 Misc. 248 (1926).
2138 Ark. 442, 212 S. W. 310, 7 A. L. R. 378 (1919).
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fense offered was that the railroad was still being operated by the
government under its war-time powers. The court said that the
existence of war and the restoration of peace are determined by
the legislative and executive departments of government and
their determination is binding in the courts. War having been
declared, the courts must recognize it as existent until the duly
constituted national power officially declared it terminated, even
though actual hostilities have long since ceased.
In *the second case the insured's death was caused by the
sinking of the Lusitania before war was declared against Ger-
many. The insurance policy contained the following provision:
"... nor shall this insurance cover . . . death . . . resulting,
directly or indirectly, wholly or partly, from war or riot." The
court said the common law understanding of the word "war"
would control the decision. A state of war existed between the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Germany. The insured was
a passenger on a British vessel at the time it was torpedoed-and
the casualty came within the exception set out in the policy.
The last of the three cases is cited as a leading case in the
insurance field where courts are confronted with the question
whether an insured's death resulted from war or "any act inci-
dent thereto." The court found that the provision in the policy
was not void as against public policy. It was further held that
the war clause referred to the time of service, that is, his status
as a member of the military service, and the company was not
liable although death was caused by pneumonia. Where the ex-
emption reads "death while engaged in military service" the word
"engaged" is emphasized and the death must be caused by mili-
tary risks to relieve the insurer from liability. 3
The acts passed by Congress to further the prosecution of
World War I contained provisions fixing the dates when they
should cease to be in force. As we have seen, these provisions
varied in the methods by which they were to expire. Mr. Justice
Brandeis has collected several of these provisions in a note to his
opinion in Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co.34
"Benham v. American Auto Life Ins. Co., 140 Ark. 612, 217 S.W. 462(1919). See also Illinois Bankers Life Assn. v. Davaney, 102 Okla. 802, 226 Pac.
101 (1924).
Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., supra, n. 12, at 165. The provisions
he cites are as follows:
(Aircraft Act, C. XVI of the Army Appropriation Act of July 9, 1918, c. 143,
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The court decisions following the end of World War II greatly
exceed the number of those decided at the close of World War I
and also in the nature of the subject matter covered. The de-
cisions, however, show the same lack of uniformity as to the
meaning given to "termination of te war" or "the end of the
war." Due to the difference of opinions of the allies as to what
should be done after the armistice, a formal termination of the
war with Germany was delayed for some time. The acts of Con-
gress passed during the Second World War differed as much in
their termination provisions as those passed during World War V,'
40 Stat. 889.) "Within one year from the signing of a treaty of peace with the
Imperial German Government."
(Departmental Reorganization Act of May 20, 1918, c. 78, 40 Stat. 556.)
"That this Act shall remain in force during the continuance of the present war
and for six months after the termination of the war by proclamation of the treaty
of peace."
(Emergency Shipping Fund Act of June 15, 1917, c. 29, 40 Stat. 182 as
amended April 22, 1918, c. 62, 40 Stat. 535, and by Act of November 4, 1918,
c. 201, 40 Stat. 1020.) "All authority . . . shall cease six months after a final
treaty of peace is proclaimed between this Government and the German Empire."
(Charter Rate and Requisition Act of July 18, 1918, c. 157, 40 Stat. 913.)
"All powers and authority ... shall cease upon the proclamation of the final treaty
of peace between the United States and the Imperial German Government."(Railroad Control Act of March 21, 1918, c. 25, 40 Stat. 451, 458.)"...
Federal control... shall continue for and during the period of the war and for a
reasonable time thereafter, which shall not exceed one year and nine months
next following the date of the proclamation by the President of the exchange of
ratifications of the treaty of peace."
(Food Control Act of August 10, 1917, c. 53, 40 Stat. 276, 283.) "Sec. 24.
That the provisions of this Act shall cease to be in effect when the existing state
of war between the United States and Germany shall have terminated, and the
fact and date of such termination shall be ascertained and proclaimed by the
President."
(Trading with the Enemy Act of October 6, 1917, c. 106, 40 State. 411, 412.)
"The words end of the war' as used herein, shall be deemed to mean the date
of proclamation of exchange of ratifications of the treaty of peace, unless the
President shall, by proclamation, declare a prior date, in which case the date so
proclaimed shall be deemed to be the 'end of the war' within the meaning of
this Act."
(Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of March 8, 1918, c. 20, 40 Stat. 440,
at 441 and 442.) "(5) The term 'termination of the war as used in this Act
shall mean the termination of the present war by the treaty of peace as pro-
claimed by the President ... Sec. 603. That this Act shall remain in force until
the termination of the war, and for six months thereafter."
IFirst War Powers Act, December 18, 1941, c. 593, 50 U. S. C. App. Sec.
645: "Titles I to VII, inclusive, and titles IX, XI and XIV of this Act and the
amendments to existing law made by any title, shall remain in force only until
December 31, 1945, or until such earlier time as the two Houses of Congress by
concurrent resolution, or the President, may designate, and after such amendments
cease to be in force any provision of law amended thereby shall be in full force
and effect as though this Act had not been enacted; but no court proceedings
brought under any such title shall abate by reason of the termination hereunder
of such title."
• Selective Training and Service Act of September 16, 1940, 50 U. S. C. see.
301: "All the provisions of this Act (except . . . [naming certain sections] . .
shall become inoperative and cease to apply on and after May 15, 1946, or the
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The decisions arising under these war-time statutes and cases
dependent upon the termination of World War II are very numer-
ous. It seems worthwhile to consider some of them. They can
be grouped under the following headings: (1) Cases arising
under war-time legislation, and (2) Private contracts: (a) Con-
tracts generally; (b) Insurance contracts.
Under the first of these headings are two dealing with rent
control. In Woods v. Miller Co.30 a preliminary injunction en-
joining violations of the Housing and Rent Act of 1947 was grant-
ed. On hearing a permanent injunction was denied by the court
below. Reversed on appeal. Mr. Justice Jackson observed:
... We have armies abroad exercising our war
power and have made no peace terms with our allies, not
to mention our principal enemies.
And in Woods v. Benson Hotel Corporation7 it was said:
The Housing and Rent Act was designed to attempt to
remedy the consequence of upset economy and distorted
social life which arose out of the war and which did not
end immediately upon the cessation of the shooting war.
date of the termination of hostilities in the present war, or on such earlier date as
may be specified in a concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress for
that purpose, except as to offences committed prior to such date, unless this Act
is continued in effect by the Congress. As used in this section the term 'date of
the termination of hostilities in the present war' means the date proclaimed by
the President as the date of such termination or the date specified in a concurrent
resolution of the two Houses of Congress as the date of such termination, which-
ever is the earlier."
Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of October 17, 1940, 50 U. S. C. App.
sec. 584: "This Act [except sections 501-548 and 560-590 of this Appendix] shall
remain in force until May 15, 1945: Provided, That should the United States be
then engaged in a war, this Act shall remain in force until such war is terminated
by a treaty of peace proclaimed by the President and for six months thereafter;
Provided further, that wherever under any section or provision of this Act a pro-
ceeding, remedy, privilege, stay, limitation, accounting, or other transaction has
been authorized or provided with respect to military service performed prior to
the date herein fixed for the termination of this Act, such section or provision
shall be deemed to continue in full force and effect so long as may be necessary
to the exercise or enjoyment of such proceeding, remedy, privilege, stay, limitation,
accounting, or other transaction."
Emergency Price Control Act of January 30, 1942, 50 U. S. C. App. sec. 901,
(b): "The provisions of this Act, and all regulations, orders, price schedules, and
requirements thereunder, shall terminate on June 30, 1945, or upon the date of a
proclamation by the President, or upon the date specified in a concurrent resolu-
tion by the two Houses of Congress, declaring that the further continuance of
the authority granted by this Act is not necessary in the interests of the national
defense and security, whichever date is the earlier; except that as to offenses com-
mitted or rights or liabilities incurred, prior to such termination date, the pro-
visions of this Act and such regulations, orders, price schedules, and requirements
shall be treated as still remaining in force for the purpose of sustaining any
proper suit, action, or prosecution with respect to any right, liability, or offense."
333 U. S. 138, 140, 68 S. Ct. 421 (1948).
75 F. Supp. 743, 747 (D. Minn. 4th D. 1948).
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It was held in Woods v. Cobleigh3 that the Emergency Price
Control Act of 1942 was not terminated by the President's procla-
mation of December 81, 1946, declaring that hostilities had termi-
nated, but also stated that "a state of war still exists."
One about to be removed from the United States under the
provisions of the Alien Enemy Act instituted habeas corpus pro-
ceedings, claiming that the President's proclamation of December
81, 1946, terminated the act. A writ was denied as the war had
not been terminated by the negotiation of a peace treaty. 9 And
another habeas corpus case is United States ex rel. Knauff v. Wat-
kins,40 in which case a war bride of German birth asked permis-
sion to enter the United States in order to apply for naturalization.
The holding was that the United States was still at "war" with
Germany in 1948, although hostilities had ceased. An interesting
case involving the rights of aliens is In re Heye's Will.4 A pro-
vision of a will specified that the executors pay no legacies to
legatees residing in Germany "while Germany is engaged in any
war." Payment was not to be made until peace was officially
declared, notwithstanding the President's declaration declaring
the cessation of hostilities on December 31, 1946.
Many of the states of the Union passed statutes giving tax
exemption benefits to their sons serving in the United States
armed forces. In State v. Gibson42 the statute exempted money
paid by the United States for military service from a soldier's
income tax, when the United States was at "war" with a foreign
country. It was held the United States was at "war" with a for-
eign state in 1949 within the meaning of the act. The court
pointed out that the President's proclamation of December 31,
1946, did not terminate the war. It said the war with Japan
ended by the treaty of peace September 8, 1951, and with Ger-
many by the President's proclamation after the joint resolution
passed by Congress October 19, 1951.
In the field of private contracts, it has been suggested that a
"war is terminated" when the shooting stops, but that in the field
of government and private parties in contracts arising under
' 75 F. Supp. 594 (D. N. H. 1947).
"Ludecke v. Watldns, 335 U. S. 160, 68 S. Ct 1429, 92 L. Ed. 881 (1948).40173 F. 2d 599 (2d C. 1949).
"195 Misc. 1026, 91 N. Y. S. 2d 266 (1949).
"64 So. 2d 75 (Ala. 1953).
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federal statute, a war is over when so declared by the legislative
and executive departments. 8
In Arroyo v. Puerto Rico Transportation Authority4 a permit
to operate a bus business in a metropolitan area was given until
one year after the termination of the war in Europe." They said
the President's proclamation had nothing to do with the case.
The proclamation proclaimed the cessation of hostilities of a
global war, not the termination of the war in Europe.
(8) The phrase 'one year after the termination of
war in Europe,'
the court added,
is the Commissioner's own language, which, in its context,
evidently refers to the actual cessation of fighting, and not
to some technical status to be determined by proclamation
of the President.
In an Iowa case a tenant brought an action against his land-
lord for a declaratory judgment to force the landlord to carry out
his contract to build a new store.45 The court took the position
that in private contracts limited to "duration of the war," courts
generally hold the meaning of the phrase is to be decided by de-
termining the intent of the parties. The court added, "However,
there is some authority holding that, despite the clear intent of
the parties to the contrary, such a contract remains in force until
peace is formally restored."46
A declaratory judgment was also sought in Boston Penny Sav-
ings Bank v. Stoneholm Co." to determine the meaning of the
language used in a land contract. The question was as to when
"the cessation of hostilities with Germany and Japan" occurred
within the meaning of these words in the contract. The judge
found as a fact that the expression "cessation of hostilities with
Germany and Japan" as used in the agreement "means at such
time as Germany and Japan shall have formally surrendered....'
The defendant claimed that the President's proclamation showed
there had been no cessation of hostilities as of December 31, 1946.
The .President, it will be recalled, said that although a state of
Termination of a War, by Ernest L. Newton, 4 Wyo. L. J. 115-120 (1949).
164 F. 2d 748, 752 (1st Cir. 1947).
"Darnall v. Day, 87 N. W. 2d 277, 280, 240 Ia. 665 (1949).
"Citing Palmer v. Pokorny, 217 Mich. 284, 186 N. W. 505.
83 N. E. 2d 885, 887, 328 Mass. 662 (1949).
"TmuvrNATioN OF WAn"
war still existed it was then possible and in the public interest
to declare that hostilities had terminated. The court said:
If the question involved here depended on whether a state
of war in the technical sense had commenced or ended, we
would be required to look to and would be bound by a
determination of the question by one of the political de-
partments of the government.
The court, however, was of the opinion that the parties in making
the agreement here used the words in their ordinary rather than
their technical sense. In a New York case, the court, on the other
hand, took the view that the parties were using words in their
proper legal signification and held that "termination of the pres-
ent war" was the date set by Congress in the act setting up a
Petroleum Coordinator July 25, 1947, and the agreement in ques-
tion ended six months later, January 25, 1948.48
An accounting on royalty payments was asked for in Girdler
Corporation v. Charles Eneu.49 These payments were claimed to
be due after September 5, 1945, the date of Japan's formal sur-
render. The contract provided interest should run for the "war
period" described as six months after the date of the "cessation
of hostilities" between the United States and Germany and Japan.
The court took the view that courts have uniformly held that the
terms "cessation of hostilities," "termination of the war," "dura-
tion of the war," "engaged in war" and "acts of war" refer to the
end of actual hostilities.
Another instance of a court being called upon to determine
when World War II terminated is Japanese Government v. Com-
mercial Casualty Insurance Co." The Japanese government
brought suit against the Frederick Mahogany Company for
breach of contract. The contract was signed before the signing
or ratification of a treaty of peace with Japan. The President had
proclaimed that hostilities were at an end and the contract was
made with approval of the Supreme Commander of the Allied
Powers. A motion to dismiss the suit was denied. The court took
a broad view of the situation and stressed the approval of the
contract by the Allied Commander as giving the plaintiff the
"S Universal Oil Products Co. v. Shell Development Co., 95 N. Y. S. 2d 355,
" 95 F. Supp. 713 (E. D. Pa. 1951).
196 Misc. 497, affd. 276 App. Div. 1058 (1950).
'O1 F. Supp. 243 (S. D. N. Y. 1951).
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right to sue in our courts. It added that the action of a political
department of the Government in recognizing a foreign govern-
ment was conclusive.
Possibly the bulk of suits involving private contracts de-
pendent on the 'termination of war' arise under insurance policies.
The decisions in this field are far from uniform in their results.
Since they deal with private contracts lip-service at least is paid
to the general proposition that the intentions of the parties gov-
ern. The provisions in the policies are not the same. Many of
the actions brought were to recover under double indemnity
clauses. The policy usually reads that double indemnity is not
to apply in event that death should occur while insured is "en-
gaged in military or naval service in time of war." Where the
insured was killed in the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, De-
cember 7, 1941, the question came before the courts whether the
insured was "engaged in military or naval service in time of war"
at the time. Some courts held we were not at war at that time
and allowed recovery.51 A different result was reached by a
federal district court in Louisiana. 2 In this last case the court
took the position that the policy was ambiguous and applied the
rule that in such case it must be construed against the insurer.
Some courts have allowed recovery where the insured was in
the military service but death was not incident to war.53 Re-
covery was allowed against the insurer where death was caused
by something not incident or peculiar to military or naval service,
as where insured was, killed in taking a training flight,5 4 and
where death of a major in the Quartermaster Corps was caused
by falling from a hotel window in France.5 But in some cases
courts have said if the insured was killed while in the military
or naval service he had a "status" in such forces and his case came
' West v. Palmetto State Life Ins. Co., 202 S. C. 422, 25 S. E. 2d 475, 145
A. L. R. 1461 (1943); Rosenan v. Idaho Mut. Ben. Ass'n, 65 Idaho 408, 145 P.
2d 227 (1944); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bennion, 158 F .2d 260 (10th Cir.
1946).
Savage v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada, 57 F. Supp. (W. D. La Monroe
Dist. 1944). 0
'" Gordon v. Lincoln National Life Ins. Co., 46 N. D. 192, 180 N. W. 514
(1920).
' Green v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 144 F. 2d 55 (1st Cir. 1944); and
Schifier v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Ace. Ass'n, 183 Misc. 74, 50 N. Y. S. 2d
376 (1944).
' Stinson v. New York Life Ins. Co., 167 F. 2d 233 (Ct. of App. Dist. of
Columbia, 1948).
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within the exemption from liability on the insurer's part.56 Re-
covery was not allowed where insured's death resulted from the
torpedoing of the United States destroyer he was on before war
was declared against Germany.57
The cases that have arisen as a result of the conflict in Korea
have been actions on insurance policies and involved for the most
part the recovery of double indemnity. In Beley v. Pennsylvania
Mut. Life Ins. Co." the lower court held the insurer liable as
there was not a war in Korea in a legal sense. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court affirmed this holding. 9 The Pennsylvania Su-
perior oourt had earlier held that the conflict in Korea was not
a declared war. It said the parties had in mind a declared war
when the insurance policy was issued. 0 In a case in a Texas court
the death of the insured, an officer traveling under military or-
ders, occurred in an airplane crash. The policy exempted from
double liability where death occurred while in military or naval
service in time of war. The court denied recovery, saying that
in reality there was a war when the death occurred in which the
United States had been seriously engaged."' Finally, the United
States District Court for the Southern District of California, after
reviewing the authorities, said that the word "war" is to be taken
in its legal sense when used in an insurance policy and held that
the Korean conflict is a war. "
The legislative and executive departments of the government
and not the courts determine when a war is legally terminated.
In actions where the public interests are involved, the tendency
is to take a legal view of the matter and hold that a mere cessa-
tion of hostilities is not enough, the ratification of a treaty of
peace is looked to as legally ending a war.
Bending v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 74 Ohio App. 182, 58 N. E. 2d 71(1944).
S tankees v. New York Life Ins. Co., 812 Mass. 366, 44 N. E. 2d 687 (1942).
Also see New York Life Ins. Co. v. Durham, 166 F. 2d 874 (10th Cir. 1948).
' 90 A. 2d 597 (Pa. Super. 1952).
' 378 Pa. 231, 95 A. 2d 202 (Pa. Supreme Ct., 1958).
1 Harding v. Pennsylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co., 90 A. 2d 589 (Pa. Super.
1952), affd. 373 Pa. 270 95 A. 2d 291 (1953).
'Western Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Meadows, 261 S. W. 2d 554 (Tex.
Supreme Ct. 1953). See also Stanberry v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 26 N. J. Super. 498,
98 A. 2d 134, 137 (1953).
'Weisman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 112 F. Supp. 420 (S. D. Calif.
C. D. 1953). See also a recent decision by the Iowa court; Landlas v. Iowa Life
Ins. Co., 63 N. W. 2d 885.
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In actions between private parties, a more lenient attitude is
taken. There are many cases that take a cessation of hostilities
as enough to satisfy the requirements of a private contract. The
court may say that the agreement of the parties shows their in-
tent that a war is terminated when hostilities have ceased. In
actions on insurance contracts the decisions are conflicting.
Such phrases as "engaged in military or naval service" have
received different interpretations by different courts. In some
the fact that the insured is in such service fixes his status, and
comes within the exemption from liability. Also, "engaged" is
sometimes taken to mean that the insurer's death must be caused
by some act incident to military service in order to free the in-
surer from liability. It follows that courts will look carefully at
all the facts in the cases before them and that few generalizations
can safely be made as to when a particular war "terminates.'
